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TIME TO RETHINK CYBERSECURITY
REFORM: THE OPM DATA BREACH AND
THE CASE FOR CENTRALIZED
CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Zachary Figueroa *

INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity breaches remain a clear and pervasive risk to the privacy of
one’s personal data and information. As of July 2015, 888 cybersecurity
breaches were reported involving some-245.9 million records compromised
worldwide for just that single year. 1 Given the increasing severity and complexity of cyber threats and incidents, this reality logically raises the poignant
issue of whether the breach of U.S. Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)
is a different type of breach or—for that matter—a big deal? 2 The answer is a
resounding “yes.” The magnitude and depth of this breach of the Federal Government, must immediately call into question the United States’ cybersecurity
policies and the troubling track record of various federal agencies ability to
*

J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America - Columbus School of Law, 2016;
M.S. Business Analytics, The Catholic University of America, 2015; B.A. Political Science,
Biola University, 2013; B.S. Business Administration - Marketing, Biola University, 2012. I
gratefully thank Ned Steiner and Michelle Curth for their thoughtful comments and editorial
savvy throughout my entire writing process, Richard Kisielowski and the entire staff of THE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY, Volume 24, for their patience and
commitment in the development of this Comment, and furthermore my family and friends
who have graciously supported and encouraged me not only in the research and writing of
this Comment but in all my endeavors.
1
GEMALTO, INDEX 2015 FIRST HALF REVIEW: FINDINGS FROM THE BREACH LEVEL INDEX 3 (2015), http://bit.ly/244WHpj (“[D]ata records stolen from state-sponsored attacks
rose dramatically compared to previous years and healthcare and government over took
retail as the major sectors under siege with the number of compromised data records.”).
2
Id. at 3 (“The biggest breach in the first half of this year, which scored a 10 on the
Breach Level Index magnitude scale, was an identity theft attack on Anthem Insurance that
exposed 78.8 million records…the analysis period included a breach of 21 million records at
[OPM] with a Breach Level Index of 9.7….”); see also IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR.,
DATA BREACH REPORTS 20, 120 (2015), http://bit.ly/1XOPp6W.
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properly secure sensitive state information and citizens’ private data. 3 While
most private sector breaches are dealt with relatively quickly to ensure consumer confidence, 4 the Federal Government lacks this agility to spring to action.
Unable to blame on any one person for this security failure, politicians continue to decry the OPM Breach as a categorical failure of the Federal Government. 5 Some suggest this incident is the most detrimental breach of national
security since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 6 and have dubbed it a
“Cyber Pearl Harbor.” 7 While not all critics have gone so far as to make such a
dramatic correlation, many agree the failure to protect OPM’s systems is a “data rupture,” 8 or “mega breach” 9—one of the largest in United States history to
date. 10 Regardless of the moniker, the effects of the OPM Breach and theft of
personal data on millions of Americans are serious and will result long-lasting
3
See, e.g., SEN. TOM COBURN, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S TRACK RECORD ON CYBERSECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2-3 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1Mn4090 (high-

lighting “real lapses by the federal government” with regard to significant breaches in cybersecurity); see also S. REP. NO. 113-240 2 (2014) (“The United States has also seen widespread targeting of, theft, and disruption of information stored on the federal government’s
own networks, where sensitive information, including information related to the operations
of critical infrastructure, is at risk of disclosure.”).
4
See, e.g., Eric Dezenhall, A Look Back at the Target Breach, HUFF. POST (April 6,
2015, 10:30 AM), http://huff.to/1T72zND (explaining that more than 100 million people
were reportedly affected by the Target breach and in the wake of stockholder backlash the
company spent nearly $252 million to combat the breach, including an additional $10 million for customers who could reasonably prove their account was severely compromised
because of the breach).
5
Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, Chaffetz Statement on
Latest OPM Data Breach Revelation (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/244WHG2 (“[S]uch
incompetence is inexcusable.…”); see also Ellen Nakashima, Chinese breach data of 4 million federal workers, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), http://wapo.st/22x7bT8 [hereinafter
Nakashima I] (statement of California Rep. Adam Schiff).
This latest intrusion…is among the most shocking because Americans may expect
that federal computer networks are maintained with state-of-the-art defenses, the
cyberthreat from hackers, criminals, terrorists and state actors is one of the greatest
challenges we face on a daily basis, and it’s clear that a substantial improvement in
our cyber databases and defenses is perilously overdue.
Id.
6
Steve Weisman, The hacking of OPM: Is it our cyber 9/11?, USA TODAY (June 13,
2015, 9:04 AM), http://usat.ly/1UNLrMF.
7
Noah Rothman, The Cyber Pearl Harbor and the Inescapable Gravity of Geopolitics,
COMMENTARY MAG. (June 5, 2015), http://bit.ly/1VHmmUi.
8
Dan Goodin, Call it a “data rupture”: Hack hitting OPM affects 21.5 million, ARS
TECHNICA (July 9, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://bit.ly/22x7nBV.
9
John Eggerton, OPM Director Resigns in Wake of Mega-Breach, MULTICHANNEL
(July 10, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://bit.ly/1Mn4oEo.
10 Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM databases compromised 22.1 million people, federal authorities say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), http://wapo.st/21I9gWp.
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implications for how the nation must manage and protect sensitive data going
forward.
The Obama Administration touted progress when it promotes cybersecurity
legislation that imposes liability against the private sector as an effort to mitigate data breaches. 11 However, the OPM Breach highlights the Federal Government’s flawed and misguided understanding of cybersecurity. The current
framework aggressively penalizes the private sector when it fails to secure individual’s data, yet falters when policing its own internal policies and agency
actions. 12 Congressman Will Hurd [R-TX] recently noted, “[t]he hypocrisy is
that while the government leaves its networks and the data of millions of
Americans at risk, it fines private companies for security breaches.” 13 In the
aftermath of the OPM Breach, the time to reevaluate the nation’s cybersecurity
strategy and the ability of the Federal Government to secure itself, its employees, its agencies, and ultimately the American people is now.
The Federal Government must develop a system that more effectively allocates resources and cybersecurity expertise at home. The backbone of any federal cybersecurity policy that promotes national security and economic prosperity must include a bilateral, international dialogue against state-sponsored
cyber espionage, whether directed toward the government or the private sector. 14 The OPM Breach highlights the ineffective, fragmented approach the
11 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015 (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1pJlHWy [hereinafter White House - Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015].
From the beginning of his Administration, the President has made it clear that cybersecurity is one of the most important challenges we face as a Nation. In response, the
U.S. Government has implemented a wide range of policies, both domestic and international, to improve our cyber defenses, enhance our response capabilities, and upgrade our incident management tools.
Id.
12 FED. TRADE COMMISSION., 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE 5 (2014),
http://1.usa.gov/1pJm2IV (“Since 2002, the FTC has brought over 50 cases against companies that have engaged in unfair or deceptive practices that put consumers’ personal data at
unreasonable risk.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Data breach results in $4.8 million HIPAA settlements (May 7, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1RyWq7e (stating
HHS had reached a resolution agreement with New York and Presbyterian Hospital to pay
the Office of Civil Rights $3,300,000 to settle potential violations of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Privacy and Security Rules as well as Columbia
University to pay $1,500,000).
13 Will Hurd, Cleaning Up the Federal Cyber Debacle, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2015,
7:09 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1SiCJDV.
14 KRISTEN FINKLEA, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44111, CYBER INTRUSION INTO
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: IN BRIEF 2-3 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Psy8KJ (“Determining an actor (and actor’s motivation) involved in a cyber incident can help guide how
the United States responds…If the perpetrator is deemed to be a state-sponsored actor with a
different motivation, the United States may utilize diplomatic or military tools in its response.”).
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Federal Government has previously utilized in modernizing federal cybersecurity. There is a pressing need for the United States Congress to enact legislation that would centralize the federal cybersecurity systems and focus resources to prevent future breaches rather than merely imposing new criminal
statutes, reporting requirements, and other bureaucratic measures.
Now is time for the Federal Government to acknowledge the failure of the
existing cybersecurity infrastructure. This Comment advocates enacting legislation that would consolidate the management of all federal cybersecurity infrastructure under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Part I
examines the shortcomings in the existing national cybersecurity policy
framework leading to the failure of OPM and will discuss current legislative
proposals and pending legislation regarding cybersecurity reform. Part II discusses the ever-increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber threats and
the inability of federal infrastructure to face security challenges of a globalized
cyberspace. The focus is particularly on breaches of government data and the
failure of OPM to implement necessary infrastructure needed to prevent recurring data breaches. In Part III, this Comment looks to pending complaints filed
by the affected individuals following the OPM Breach, as well as past instances where data breaches resulted in adjudication. Finally, Part IV concludes the
United States cybersecurity policy must better manage federal data by: (1) suspending the current framework, and (2) by implementing a centralized cybersecurity framework that authorizes DHS to exercise regulatory and enforcement powers in order to combat domestic and foreign threats to the federal
cyber-infrastructure.
I.

BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2015, The New York Times broke a story revealing OPM experienced an almost year-long intrusion of the agency’s information technology
systems by unknown intruders. 15 OPM is the primary federal agency tasked
with conducting and storing data related to the majority of federal background
investigation used to gain security clearances. 16 This breach resulted in the exposure of at least four million former and current federal employees’ personally identifiable information (“PII”). 17 Despite this initial report, on June 12,
2015, the White House confirmed a second, more severe breach that occurred
earlier in April 2015, which targeted the agency’s database of employee back15 David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1XsoDU6.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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ground investigation records. 18
While OPM initially projected only a small amount of records where compromised, an ongoing interagency investigation with DHS has “concluded with
high confidence that sensitive information, including the Social Security Numbers (SSNs) of 21.5 million individuals, was stolen from the background investigation databases.” 19 OPM’s press release stated, “[t]his includes 19.7 million
individuals that applied for a background investigation, and 1.8 million nonapplicants, predominantly spouses or co-habitants of applicants…and approximately 1.1 million [files] include fingerprints.” 20
In the 21st century, the flow of globally-interconnected information, communications, and data stored across cyberspace 21 has become an integral part of
the Federal Government’s cyber-infrastructure. 22 To ignore the severe implications a breach poses to national security and economic prosperity would be
grossly negligent. 23 Upon taking office, President Barack Obama claimed,
“[o]ur digital infrastructure—the networks and computers we depend on every
day—will be treated as they should be: as a strategic national asset.” 24 However, since the President made this statement, subsequent breaches, hacks, and
failures of the cyber-systems continue to underscore the failure to establish a
cohesive strategy. 25 In order to realize the vast benefits of technological ad18 Kate Vinton, White House Confirms Second Government Data Breach Targeting
Sensitive Military, Intelligence Personnel Data, FORBES (June 12, 2015, 5:52 PM),
http://onforb.es/1sNk63q; Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, White House Weighs Sanctions
After Second Breach of a Computer System, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1pAHqiM; David Bisson, The OPM Breach: Timeline of a Hack, TRIPWIRE
(July 10, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://bit.ly/1qFw6lD.
19 Press Release, U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., OPM Announces Steps to Protect
Federal Workers and Others from Cyber Threats (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1q3e7WL
[hereinafter OPM - Steps to Protect Fed. Workers].
20 Id.
21 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-24, 3 (January 8,
2008), http://bit.ly/1RvBAXw (“‘[C]yberspace’ means the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.”).
22 Id. at 2.
23 Tony Scott, FACT SHEET: Enhancing and Strengthening the Federal Government’s
Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 17, 2015, 5:44 PM),
http://1.usa.gov/1WMwt8N (“[C]ybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic
and national security challenges of the 21st Century. Technologies and systems of the past
cannot keep pace with rapidly evolving and persistent cyber threats.”).
24 Remarks on Securing the Nation’s Information and Communications Infrastructure,
2009 Daily COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOC., DCPD200900410, 3 (May 29, 2009).
25 Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden, Chairman on Committee of Finance, to William
Evanina, Director, Nat’l Counterintelligence and Sec. Ctr. 1 (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1Rn4WKX (“The fact that such sensitive information was not adequately
protected raises real questions about how well the government can protect personnel information in the future, especially as the security clearance process moves toward conducting
ongoing evaluations and incorporating publicly available electronic information….”).
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vancements, citizens must be informed and confident in the infrastructure in
place keeping their information secure and preventing malicious infiltrations. 26
Furthermore, nation require public confidence of their digital infrastructure to
secure sensitive data and protect national security. 27 This is not to say that any
one policy-shift will prevent all malicious activity, but the nation’s current cybersecurity strategy remains fragmented and its bureaucratic scheme disorganized, which only hinders the America’s ability to engage other nation-states
in meaningful dialogue to discourage cybercrime in all its forms. 28
Cybersecurity will only continue to pose more challenges to policy makers
as technology advances; malicious actors will continue to develop new methods to exploit networks, conduct cyber espionage, or compromise national security with greater ease. 29 Joel Brenner, a former senior counsel to the National
26 Michael James Barton, The ‘Human’ Factor is Key in Cybersecurity, INSIDESOURCES
(July 16, 2015), http://bit.ly/1U9Q6XV.
The human factor has an important element: Policy. The policy governing computer
access in an organization is critical—who has access to what, and when, and from
where should be the cornerstone of a security plan. These policies determine who has
access to what intellectual property, and who may access what information remotely,
how many characters are required in a password, and a whole host of other elements
critical to an organization’s security posture.
Id.
27 Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why The OPM Breach Is Such a Security and Privacy Debacle, WIRED (June 11, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://bit.ly/1Pu5UPN (quoting Chris Eng,
Vice President of Research Veracode)
‘It could be very damaging from a counterintelligence and national security standpoint’…SF-86 forms can include a list of foreign contacts with whom a worker has
come in contact. Diplomats and other workers with access to classified information
are required—depending on their job—to provide a list of these contacts. There is
concern that if the Chinese government got hold of lists containing the names of Chinese nationals who had been in touch with US government workers, this could be
used to blackmail or punish them if they had been secretive about the contact.
Id.
28 Brendan Sasso, Does NSA Spying Leave the U.S. Without Moral High Ground in
China Hack?, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2014), http://theatln.tc/1qFwC2Y (“[T]he U.S. is an
awkward position in deciding how to respond to the humiliating blow. That’s partially because in the two years since Edward Snowden’s leaks about U.S. surveillance, the Obama
administration has repeatedly argued that hacking into computer networks to spy on foreigners is completely acceptable behavior.”).
29 KRISTEN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42547,
CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2015),
http://bit.ly/1OT6flC; Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers go after U.S. Workers’ Personal Data, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), http://wapo.st/21JAkol [hereinafter
Nakashima II] (quoting Shawn Henry, former executive assistant director of the FBI’s
Criminal, Cyber, Response and Service Branch) (“If the Chinese government got access to
that type of data, it would be a significant breach because the data would allow them to have
very detailed information about people who hold very sensitive clearances….”).
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Security Agency, explained “[t]he Internet was not built for security, yet we
have made it the backbone of virtually all private-sector and government operations, as well as communications.” 30 However, this reality cannot simply absolve the government’s obligation to protect sensitive information by implementing a centralized cybersecurity strategy and the development of secure
cyber-infrastructure. In order to effectuate the goal securing the nation’s critical infrastructure 31, it is necessary to enact cybersecurity legislation with authoritative guidance at the federal level regarding breach notification and mitigation for not only the private-sector, but also federal agencies following any
cyber-attack.
In addition to the effective education and recruitment of users who are authenticated to use such systems, there must be a consolidation of oversight and
management of the Federal Government’s cyberspace under the supervision
and authority of one centralized agency that actively monitors and implements
necessary infrastructure upgrades. DHS and each agency’s Office of the Inspector General were recently given more expanded advisory roles in assisting
agencies in meeting their cybersecurity goals. 32 Yet, the evidence shows agencies’ responsiveness ranges from slow to blatantly unresponsive in heeding
issued warnings, recommendations, and audits—to the detriment of 21.5 million Americans with data stolen during the OPM Breach. 33 Under a centralized
30 Joel Brenner, Nations everywhere are exploiting the lack of cybersecurity, WASH.
POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://wapo.st/1pKCEA2 (“Pervasive connectivity has brought dramatic gains in productivity and pleasure but has created equally dramatic vulnerabilities.
Huge heists of personal information are common, and cyber-theft of intellectual property
and infrastructure penetrations continue at a frightening pace.”).
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-626T, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE:
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN PROTECTING KEY SECTORS 1-2 n.2 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. §
5195c(e) (“‘[C]ritical infrastructure’ means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, and national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”).
32 White House - Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015, supra note 11.
33 Memorandum from Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, Office of Personnel
Mgmt., to Katherine Archuleta, Director, Office of Personnel Mgmt. 1 (June 17, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1UQVT7m [hereinafter Memorandum from Inspector General McFarland
to Director Archuleta]
Our primary concern is that the [Office of the Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”)]
has not followed U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements and
project management best practices. The OCIO has initiated this project without a
complete understanding of the scope of OPM’s existing technical infrastructure or the
scale and costs of the effort required to migrate it to the new environment.
Id.; Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs., 114th Cong. (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Under
Attack - S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs.] (statement of Patrick E. McFarland,
Inspector General, Office of Personnel Mgmt.). (“Although OPM has made progress in
certain areas, some of the current problems and weaknesses were identified as far back as
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cybersecurity scheme headed by DHS, agencies ought be required to meet cybersecurity requirements and be held liable for disregarding necessary oversight and investment recommendations.
II.

U.S. CYBERSECURITY POLICY: A SCATTERED FRAMEWORK

There is little doubt the revelation of the OPM Breach thrusted federal cybersecurity back into the spotlight. 34 The impetus has long been on expansion,
modernization, and regulation of private-sector cyberspace rather than on securing the current, aging federal systems. 35 However, a review of the nation’s
cybersecurity policy as a whole reveals a fragmented framework of vague responsibilities that are delegated to various agencies as a means of combatting
the expanding threat of cyber-attacks. 36 A centralized cybersecurity framework
would involve both securing the federal cyber-infrastructure as well as assisting in the regulation of nonfederal systems. 37
Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. We believe this long history of systemic failures to properly manage
its IT infrastructure may have ultimately led to the breaches we are discussing today.”)
34 J.D. Harrison, Will OPM Breach Spur Senate Action on Cybersecurity InformationSharing Legislation?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 19, 2015, 3:45 PM),
http://uscham.com/1UokcJS.
35 See ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1-2 (2013),
http://bit.ly/1U7fE5c (listing recent congressional statutes that address cybersecurity and
short summaries regarding how the statute affects cybersecurity).
36 Id. at 4
Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to
their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for critical infrastructure, such as the Department of Transportation for the transportation sector.
Cross-agency responsibilities are complex, and any brief description is necessarily
oversimplified. In general, in addition to the roles of White House entities, DHS is the
primary civil-sector cybersecurity agency. NIST, in the Department of Commerce,
develops cybersecurity standards and guidelines that are promulgated by OMB, and
the Department of Justice is largely responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to
cybersecurity. The National Science Foundation (NSF), NIST, and DHS all perform
research and development (R&D) related to cybersecurity. The National Security
Agency (NSA) is the primary cybersecurity agency in the national security sector, although other agencies also play significant roles. The recently established U.S. Cyber
Command, part of the U.S. Strategic Command in the Department of Defense (DOD),
has primary responsibility for military cyberspace operations.
Id.
37 Aliya Sternstein, Senators Want Homeland Security to be a Leading Cyberdefense
Agency, NAT’L J. (July 23, 2015).
Just as CYBERCOM monitors and blocks threats to the military network, DHS, under
proposed legislation, would scan for and repel attacks against the dot-gov domain. In
the event of a suspected threat, the new 2015 Federal Information Security Management Reform Act lets DHS direct agencies ²to take any lawful action with respect to
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However, the complexity of the current cybersecurity framework highlights
the fragmented oversight and enforcement approaches across the public and
private sectors, 38 which has led to various states’ responses. 39 Contributing to
the complexity, more than fifty federal statutes 40 currently bear the burden of
codifying America’s cybersecurity framework. 41 With such a fragmented approach to cybersecurity, the difficulties faced in implementing a centralized
national policy and promoting meaningful cybersecurity standards with other
nation-states should come as no surprise. Technology has progressed significantly in the last several decades, to the point where a system can be programmed and allowed to run with very little need for human interaction or supervision; 42 nevertheless, the reality is that the human component in securing
data remains the largest contributor to breach, loss, and theft. 43 Furthermore,
these advancements have given rise to the threat of hacking organizations, corporate espionage, 44 and state-sponsored government espionage. 45
the operation of the information system² at risk. IT systems subject to partial override,
during emergencies, would include private-sector networks that handle government
information. The bill also would task DHS with ²conducting targeted risk assessments
and operational evaluations² of agency and contractor systems, including vulnerability
scans.
Id.

See generally FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 5.
FRANCESCA SPIDALIERI, PELL CTR. FOR INT’L. RELATIONS AND PUB. POLICY, STATE OF
THE STATES ON CYBERSECURITY 7-8 (2015), http://bit.ly/1UPdBa9.
40 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012)
(prohibiting unauthorized electronic eavesdropping); E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012) (serving as the primary legislative vehicle to guide federal IT management and
initiatives to make information and services available online, and includes various cybersecurity requirements); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§
3541, et seq. (2012) (clarifying and strengthening NIST and agency cybersecurity responsibilities, establishing a central federal incident center, and making OMB, rather than the Secretary of Commerce, responsible for promulgating federal cybersecurity standards); see
generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 52-61 tbl.2 (listing the entire list of federal statutes concerning cybersecurity).
41 See FISHER, supra note 35, at 52-61 tbl.2.
42 Barton, supra note 26.
43 Id. (“Companies can no longer rely on software, hardware and security firewalls.
Their employees are the target of the professional hackers, and are the network’s weak link.
Routine cybersecurity training paired with a robust review of policy provides the best defense of an organization’s network.”).
44 Charles Riley, Xi Goes to Washington: 4 Problems for the U.S. and China, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015, 2:52 AM), http://cnnmon.ie/22yU3gj (“Washington also says it has
caught Chinese spies stealing blueprints and business plans. Last year, federal prosecutors
took the unprecedented step of filing formal criminal charges against five Chinese government spies for breaking into Alcoa, U.S. Steel Corp., Westinghouse and others.”).
45 Alan Spiress, Computer System Under Attack, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2006),
http://wapo.st/1WMGhjb (noting in 2006 Chinese hackers breached the system of a sensitive Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security, “forcing it to replace hundreds
of workstations and block employees from regular use of the Internet for more than a
38
39
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Despite the ever evolving external threats associated with cybersecurity, the
internal threats are most neglected and can easily cripple any policy framework
that is not properly implemented or adhered to. A recent Government Accountably Office (“GAO”) review of federal information security found there
was a significant decrease in agencies reporting their users had received security awareness training in 2014. 46 The effective cornerstone of any policy recommendation on cybersecurity must focus on securing user access, system
modification capabilities, and exfiltration sensitive federal data clearance,
since these users remain the greatest risk to the proper function of any cybersecurity policy. 47
Currently, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
(“FISMA”), and its amended iterations are the primary means of codifying the
government’s approach to cybersecurity. 48 However, in the wake of the OPM
Breach, the Obama Administration’s own cybersecurity agenda together with
pending legislative proposals before Congress fall short in synthesizing the
United States’ response to increasingly malicious cybersecurity threats.
A. The Federal Information Security Management Acts of 2002 and 2014
Under FISMA, 49 federal agencies are tasked with cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems, while other responsibilities for cybersecurity
functions are distributed among several other agencies. 50 The FISMA scheme
tasks each agency head to provide “information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of” the agenmonth.”); Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, WASH. POST
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://wapo.st/1WMGhQe (“Hackers thought to be working for the Russian
government breached the unclassified White House computer networks in recent weeks…”).
46 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-714, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY: AGENCIES NEED TO CORRECT WEAKNESSES AND FULLY IMPLEMENT SECURITY PROGRAMS
37 (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-714].
47 Barton, supra note 26; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HANDING OVER
THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE: OPM DEMONSTRATED THAT ANTIQUATED SECURITY PRACTICES
HARM NATIONAL SECURITY 21 (2015), http://bit.ly/1XRiC1e [hereinafter HANDING OVER
THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE] (“Reform of the critical cybersecurity infrastructure as reformation of expertise of personnel, reformation of vulnerable, outdated technology, and
reformation to end 25 years of poor cybersecurity practices can last far longer than 30 years
and help to mitigate extenuating long-term consequences of the OPM’s breach.”).
48 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541, et seq.
(2012).
49 Id.
50 HOUSE REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
13 (2011), http://1.usa.gov/1VLiL7I (“FISMA is the main law governing the federal government’s information security program.”).
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cy’s information or information systems. 51 In addition, the legislation requires
federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program. 52 Often such tasks are designated to the Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) within each agency. 53 Under current law, in addition to
its budgetary role in federal cybersecurity efforts, the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) possesses the primary responsibility for promulgating
and enforcing information security requirements under FISMA for federal information systems for many federal agencies and most notably OPM. 54
FISMA requires agencies provide security awareness training to personnel,
including contractors and other users of information systems that support the
operations and assets of the agency. 55 This scheme provides guidelines to
agencies regarding information security risks associated with their operational
activities and details the responsibilities each agency possesses—yet falls short
of centralizing oversight authority to one particular agency in order to protect
national security. 56 FISMA also requires agencies to train and oversee personnel who have significant information security responsibilities. 57 While the
number of individuals with significant security responsibilities has decreased
in 2014, there has been an increase in user and contractor related breach incidents that call into question whether agencies are doing enough to properly
train individuals. 58
In April 2015, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Office of Inspector General reported two contractors had improperly accessed the agency’s network
from foreign countries using personally owned equipment. 59 In February 2015,
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3543 (2012).
Id. § 3544(a).
53 Id. § 3544.
54 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43831, CYBERSECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: IN BRIEF 3 (2014), http://bit.ly/1YT5dX6; The Expanding Cyber Threat: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Res. & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong.
66 (2015) (statement of Eric A. Fisher, Senior Specialist in Science & Technology, Congressional Research Service).
55 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 7.
56 FINKLEA ET AL., supra note 14, at 6 (“FISMA largely does not apply to national security systems, which fall under the Committee on National Security
Systems.”); Richard W. Walker, FISMA Security Approach Falls Short, Fed IT Pros Say,
INFORMATIONWEEK DARKREADING (Sept. 25, 2013), http://ubm.io/25izs1d (according to a
2013 OMB survey, only 27% of federal agencies reported that their agencies are “currently
perfectly compliant” with FISMA).
57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-776, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY: MIXED PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING PROGRAM COMPONENTS; IMPROVED METRICS NEEDED TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS 16 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/244Y0EO.
58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-612, INFORMATION SECURITY: AGENCIES NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTOR CONTROLS 17 (2014),
http://1.usa.gov/1THdTjr.
59 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT NO. 13-01730-159,
51
52
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the Director of National Intelligence stated that unauthorized computer intrusions were detected on the networks of OPM and two of its contractors. 60 The
contractors were processing sensitive PII, related to national security clearances for federal employees. While these instances stand apart from otherwise
unknown actors that caused the OPM Breach, one contractors has been implicated in the breach. 61 The GAO’s focus on cybersecurity training for users
clearly highlights one of the more fundamental recommendations that agencies
must implement in order to become better prepared to combat cybersecurity
threats. 62 Providing training for agency personnel is critical to securing systems
and information because people are one of the weakest links when securing
systems and networks.
In the wake of these security incidents, Congress passed an updated Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, 63 (“FISMA 2014”) which
was signed into law by President Obama in December 2014. 64 This legislation
was the first attempt in more than a decade by the Federal Government toward
delegating agency tasks with regard to cybersecurity and data protection. 65 As
amended, FISMA 2014 still requires federal agencies to implement agencywide cybersecurity programs to protect sensitive data and information, extending such requirements to service and systems provided or managed by another
agency, contractor, or outside source. 66 However, FISMA 2014 expands authorization to include DHS, by tasking them to assist OMB with oversight and
regulation of agencies’ implementation of cybersecurity programs, operate the
federal information security incident center (“US-CERT”), and provide agencies with operational and technical assistance for continuously monitoring and
mitigating cyber vulnerabilities (“EINSTEIN”). 67
Codifying a set of directives outlined in 2010 from the Obama AdministraADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION: IMPROPER ACCESS TO THE VA NETWORK BY VA CONTRACTORS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES 2 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1XRkiYs.
60 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/25iz6rd (statement of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).
61 Aaron Boyd, Contractor breach gave hackers keys to OPM data, FED. TIMES (June
25, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://bit.ly/1RllYnW.
62 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 27.
63 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128
Stat. 3073 (2014).
64 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Secretary Bills Signed into Law (Dec. 18, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1XXgSDJ.
65 Sean B. Hoar, Congress Passes the Federal Information Security Modernization Act
of 2014: Bringing Federal Agency Information Security into the New Millennium, PRIV. &
SEC. L. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), http://bit.ly/1MoBMLf.
66 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 11.
67 Id. at 11.
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tion’s cybersecurity policy objective, the FISMA 2014 gives DHS operational
authority to oversee implementation of federal cybersecurity systems, including the authority to issue binding operational directives 68 and set requirements
for breach notification within federal agencies. 69 In addition, agency CIOs were
provided with additional budgeting and program authorities. 70 In addition to the
advisory roles played predominately by OMB and DHS, other agencies such as
the National Institute of Science and Technology (“NIST”), played a critical
role in issuing and updating security standards and guidelines for information
systems utilized by Federal agencies. 71 Despite these updates, the OPM Breach
reveals how little impact such changes have had in impacting the government’s
approach to these real, ever present threats.
B. Current Legislative Proposals
Several bills concerning cyber threats have been proposed by the current
Congress, although all stagnated in Spring 2015. 72 Nevertheless, in the wake of
the OPM Breach, legislators have called for a renewed push toward meaningful reform on cybersecurity. 73 While much progress was made during Summer
2015 on amending these cyber-related bills, many have cautioned that the cur68 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128
Stat. 3073 (2014) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3552(b)(1)).
The term “binding operational directive” means a compulsory direction to an agency
that is for the purposes of safeguarding Federal information and information systems
from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability or
risk.
Id.
69 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag & Howard A. Schmidt to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies 2 (July 6, 2010), http://1.usa.gov/1UokNvg (delegating responsibilities to DHS in 2010).
70 40 U.S.C. § 11319 (2014).
71 See ELAINE BARKER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 80056B, RECOMMENDATION FOR PAIR-WISE KEY-ESTABLISHMENT SCHEMES USING INTEGER
FACTORIZATION CRYPTOGRAPHY, at ii (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1XRkRSg (“NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum
requirements for Federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not
apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate Federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.”).
72 RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43317, CYBERSECURITY: LEGISLATION, HEARINGS, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS 2 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Ts7fPH (“More than 20
bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would address several issues, including data-breach notification, incidents involving other nation-states, information sharing,
law enforcement and cybercrime, protection of critical infrastructure (CI), workforce development, and education.”).
73 INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., MOVING FORWARD: HOW VICTIMS CAN
REGAIN CONTROL AND MITIGATE THREATS IN THE WAKE OF THE OPM BREACH 3-4 (2015),
http://bit.ly/1XRiC1e [hereinafter MOVING FORWARD].
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rent proposals remain disproportionally focused on: breach notifications, information sharing and private sector enforcement rather than on agency jurisdiction, oversight authority, and infrastructure protection. 74
The House of Representatives bills—originally labeled H.R. 1560: Protecting Cyber Networks Act (“PCNA”); and H.R. 1731: the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (“NCPAA”)—passed the House during the week of April 20, 2015 and were consolidated, with the PCNA becoming Title I and the NCPAA Title II of H.R. 1560. 75 Both these bills focus on the
sharing of cyber threat information within the private sector, and between the
private sector and government, creating a structure for the information-sharing
process; and further address issues like consumer privacy, individual civil liberties with regard to PII, and the liability risks of private-sector sharing. 76
In the Senate, S. 754, the Cyber Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”),
and S. 456, The Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 (“CTSA”), have been combined under S. 754. 77 The bill was long stalled in the Senate, but passed in October 2015. 78 Following the OPM Breach revelation, the White House was
quick to endorse this effort by suggesting the Senate bill improved on earlier
efforts—both in the protection of PII and better intimations on the allowed uses of personal information. 79 However, there was intense opposition to S. 754
from civil liberties, privacy advocates, some legislators, and even from the
DHS itself. 80 Senator Al Franken [D-MN] warned the sharing provisions of the
bill, “could sweep away important privacy protections.” 81 The opposition re74 See Bryan Thompson & Sean B. Hoar, 2015 Data Breach Legislation Six Month Review: Many Proposals, Few Changes, PRIV. & SEC. L. BLOG (July 8, 2015),
http://bit.ly/1TSIbvH ; Katie Bo Williams, Six Cybersecurity Lawmakers to Watch in 2016,
THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://bit.ly/1RppVLM; Katie Bo Williams, House
Passes Bill Mandating DHS Cybersecurity Strategy, THE HILL (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:52 PM),
http://bit.ly/1VLmmCV.
75 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44069, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION
SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 1560 (PCNA AND NCPAA) AND S. 754 (CISA) 3 (2015),
http://bit.ly/1TSIjLA.
76 ERIC A. FISHER & STEPHANIE M. LOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43996, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 1560 AND H.R. 1731 AS PASSED
BY THE HOUSE 2-3 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Tvl7DH.
77 Taylor Armerding, Cybersecurity Legislation Still Draws Intense Opposition, CIO
(Sept. 23, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://bit.ly/1pKNRAs.
78 See S.754 – Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, Congress.gov (last visited Mar. 7, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/1U9Rjyr.
79 Cory Bennet, White House Endorses Senate Cyber Bill, THE HILL (Aug. 4, 2015, 5:29
PM), http://bit.ly/1T9BGZl.
80 Eric Geller, Sen. Ron Wyden thinks the next big cybersecurity bill could make things
worse, THE DAILY DOT (Sept. 14, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://bit.ly/1TSIg2r.
81 Sen. Al. Franken, Remarks of Sen. Al Franken on the Cybersecurity and Information
Sharing Act of 2015, SEN. AL FRANKEN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1SfR29O; see also
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sulted in more than a hundred amendments, only three of which were ultimately agreed upon, drawing even more opposition of the bill to protect privacy. 82
One such amendment, which could seemingly keep the impetus on cybersecurity reform in the congressional forefront is S. 1828, the Federal Information
Security Management Reform Act of 2015, would directly tackle federal cybersecurity issues raised with the OPM Breach. 83 Several senators have even
gone so far as to publicly endorse a revamping of cybersecurity policy that
would put DHS in charge. 84 Senator Susan Collins [R-ME], who co-sponsored
S. 1828, stated at its introduction:
At present, DHS does not have the authority to monitor the networks of
government agencies unless they have permission from that agency. DHS also
cannot regularly deploy countermeasures to block malware without permission
from the agency. This limited authority hinders the security of .gov information systems which – as evidenced by the recent OPM attack – contain highly sensitive personal data such as Social Security numbers, home addresses,
dates of birth, and in some cases, extensive background information of federal
employees, retirees, and contractors. 85
In total, S. 1828 addresses five key policy areas to combatting future cyberattacks by: (1) allowing DHS to operate intrusion detection and prevention
capabilities on all federal agencies on the “.gov domain;” 86 (2) direct DHS to
conduct risk assessments of any network within the government domain; 87 (3)
give the Secretary of DHS authority to operate defensive countermeasures on
these agency networks once a cyber threat has been detected; 88 (4) strengthen
and streamline the authority Congress gave to DHS last year to issue binding
operational directives to federal agencies, especially to respond to substantial

114 Cong. Rec. S7498 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2015).
82 See S.754–Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, Congress.gov (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/1U9Rjyr; Mike Masnick, Senate Rejects All CISA Amendments Designed to Protect Privacy, Reiterating That It’s a Surveillance Bill, TECHDIRT
(Oct. 27, 2015, 11:40 AM), http://bit.ly/1RkiczY.
83 Aaron Boyd, New Bill Strengthens DHS Role in Federal Cybersecurity, FED. TIMES
(July 23, 2015, 11:08 AM), http://bit.ly/1VNDEPU.
84 Cory Bennett, Senators unveil new Homeland Security cyber bill, (July 22, 2015, 9:14
AM), http://bit.ly/1UQPLef (statement of Sen. Susan Collins) (“While the Department of
Homeland Security has the mandate to protect the .gov domain, it has only limited authority
to do so.”).
85 Press Release, Sen. Kelly Ayotte, Following Cyber Attack at OPM, Ayotte and Colleagues
Introduce
Bipartisan
Cybersecurity
Bill,
(July
22,
2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1UW32Cg.
86 Federal Information Security Management Reform Act of 2015 § 2, S. 1828, 114th
Cong. (2015).
87 Id.
88 Id.
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cybersecurity threats in emergency circumstances; 89 and (5) require the OMB
to report to Congress annually on the extent to which it has exercised its existing authority to enforce government-wide cybersecurity standards. 90
While the co-sponsors of the bill suggest the proposal is a proper fix to the
procedural problems that led to the devastating OPM Breach, others have decried it as a simple codification of the role DHS has already tried to take in
light the increased threat of cyber-attacks in the last decade. 91 This is not to say
that legislatively authorizing DHS with centralized authority will not be the
first step in streamlining the process of securing the nation’s cyberinfrastructure. Unfortunately, this legislation does not authorize the DHS to
take control of agency networks during cyber-emergencies nor does it define
what a cyber-emergency might constitute. 92 Senator Mark Warner [D-VA] has
stated,
The attack on OPM has been a painful illustration of just how behind the
curve some of our federal agencies have been when it comes to cybersecurity…If we want to be better prepared to meet this threat in the future, we have
to make sure that the [DHS] has the tools it needs to adequately secure our federal civilian networks. 93
C. The Administrative Approach – Executive Orders and Political Banter
Since taking office, President Barack Obama has touted the work that his
Administration has done in regard to securing the nation’s cyberspace. 94 Immediately after taking office, President Obama announced his plan to tackle
cybersecurity issues. 95 While such plans shifted in the subsequent years, in
Id.
Id.
91 Senator
Susan M. Collins, Statement on S. 1828, (July 22, 2015),
http://bit.ly/1XOpRtg.
92 Sternstein, supra note 37.
93 Press Release, Sen. Mark Werner, Following Cyber Attack at OPM, Warner & Collins Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Improve Government Cybersecurity (July 22, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1UwgEpf.
94 White House - Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015, supra note 11 (“As the
cyber threat continues to increase in severity and sophistication, so does the pace of the
Administration’s efforts. Included in this fact sheet are some of the achievements of this
Administration in just the last six months.”).
95 Tony Scott, FACT SHEET: Enhancing and Strengthening the Federal Government’s
Cybersecurity, The White House: Blog (June 17, 2015, 5:44 PM),
http://1.usa.gov/1WMwt8N.
In 2009, President Obama named the first Cybersecurity Coordinator and directed a
comprehensive Cyberspace Policy Review to assess U.S. policies and structures for
cybersecurity. Since then, the Administration has taken a number of aggressive ac89
90
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2015, the President released Executive Order regarding cybersecurity threats in
the wake of increasing private sector breaches 96 and most recently issued Executive Order 13694, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose financial sanctions on individuals and entities whose malicious cyber-enabled
activities have contributed to a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, economic health, or financial stability of the United States. 97 A
move lauded as a strong political maneuver sharply directed at those engaging
in state-sponsored or government espionage. 98
Even as recently as July 2015, following the OPM Breach, OMB was directed to launch a 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint to assess and improve the
health of all federal assets and networks, both civilian and military. 99 As part of
this “Sprint,” OMB ordered agencies to further protect federal information,
improve the resilience of its networks, and report on their successes and challenges. 100 Agencies were instructed to immediately patch critical vulnerabilities, review and tightly limit the number of privileged users with access to authorized systems, and introduce strong authentication, especially for privileged
tions to upgrade the Federal Government’s technology infrastructure and protect government networks and information, implementing tools and policies in order to detect
and mitigate evolving threats.
Id.

Exec. Order No. 13691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9,349, 9,349 (Feb. 20, 2015).
In order to address cyber threats to public health and safety, national security, and
economic security of the United States, private companies, nonprofit organizations,
executive departments and agencies (agencies), and other entities must be able to
share information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and collaborate to respond in as close to real time as possible.

96

Id.

97 Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077, 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015) (“[T]he increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”); Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Presidential Statement on Executive Order “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging
in
Significant
Malicious
Cyber-Enabled
Activities”
(April
1,
2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1XOpZZP (“As we have seen in recent months, these threats can emanate
from a range of sources and target our critical infrastructure, our companies, and our citizens. This Executive order offers a targeted tool for countering the most significant cyber
threats that we face.”).
98 Robert Hackett, Sanctions: America’s best new weapon against cyber crime, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2015, 9:47 AM), http://for.tn/1sNlFP9.
99 Scott, supra note 23 (“United States Chief Information Officer (CIO) Tony Scott
recently launched a 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint. As part of the effort, the Federal CIO has
instructed Federal agencies to immediately take a number of steps to further protect Federal
information and assets and improve the resilience of Federal networks.”).
100 Id.
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users. 101 All of these actions reduce the risk of adversaries penetrating federal
networks. While the policy goals won political points in the news cycle, at a
time when some federal employees were just beginning to be notified that their
private information had been compromised, the excitement has wore thin with
the high-level administration officials, and the mess has since been left to the
agency heads and congressional committees to figure out how to grasp and
reconcile the remain difficult issues. 102
III. AGING INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE INCREASING THREAT OF
FEDERAL DATA BREACHES
Despite the various efforts to implement a cybersecurity policy for the nation, the reality is technology has advanced far faster in the last decade than the
Federal Government’s ability to regulate and protect these systems. 103 Since
2006, the number cybersecurity incidents related to federal systems has increased exponentially, severely calling into question the effectiveness of the
government’s current approach to data protection. 104 According to the GAO
and US-CERT, 5,503 incidents were reported in 2006 compared to 67,168 reported in 2014—an increase of more than 1,100 percent. 105 This increase in
reported incidents is staggering considering the amount of money and resources spent by the Federal Government on information technology and cybersecurity infrastructure. Some have begun to question as to whether the investment has been worth the return. 106
102 Bob Gourley, List of Cyber Threat “Wake-Up Calls” Growing: Policy makers have
been hitting the snooze button since 1970, CTO VISION, (June 7, 2015), http://bit.ly/1Xsqicf
(“Our history indicates cyber security events frequently cause action and remediation and
get widespread attention. But soon after the attempt to remediate, organizations collectively
forget about the threat.”).
103 Shawn Zeller, Congress Fails to Keep Up with Rapid Technology Advances, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2015, 12:20 PM), http://trib.in/22L1cql; see also Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and
Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://bit.ly/20spcfM.
104 Eli Dourado & Andrea Castillo, Federal Cybersecurity Breaches Mount Despite Increased Spending, MERCATUS CTR. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://bit.ly/1RDMX54.
After more than a decade of billion dollar investments and government-wide information sharing, in 2013 ‘inspectors general at 21 of the 24 agencies cited information
security as a major management challenge for their agency, and 18 agencies reported
that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or significant deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting.
Id.
105 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE., GAO-15-725T, RECENT DATA BREACHES ILLUSTRATE NEED FOR STRONG CONTROLS ACROSS FEDERAL AGENCIES 3-4 fig.1 (2015),
http://1.usa.gov/25ozuSH [hereinafter GOA-15-725T].
106 Dourado, supra note 104.
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The Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 2016 allocates $14 billion on cybersecurity. 107 President Obama requested $12.5 billion in 2015, which is roughly ten
percent less; yet, the figure is almost 35 percent more than was spent in Fiscal
Year 2014. 108 The federal cybersecurity budget represents about 16 percent of
the total federal information technology budget of $86.4 billion for 2016, compared to the four percent that private companies typically allocate for the same
purpose. 109
DHS has allotted a large portion of its 2016 Budget—$582 million—for the
EINSTEIN intrusion detection system, continuous diagnostics programs, and
mitigation programs alone in order to continue the progress that has been made
in deploying early detection systems across various federal agency networks. 110
The latest EINSTEIN intrusion detection iteration, EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated
or “E3A” is particularly of interest because it is purportedly capable of detecting the types of intrusions that occurred at OPM. 111 While the system has been
functional for a short while, DHS has been unsuccessful at securing its implementation across the federal agency network; the agency remains confident it
will continue to expand the systems reach in order to detect future threats. 112
107 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 16 (2016), http://1.usa.gov/1XSXF66 [hereinafter OMB
- FY 2016 BUDGET]; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, The President’s Budget for Fiscal
Year 2017, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, http://1.usa.gov/1ZAS7yy (Mar. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter OMB - The President’s Budget for FY 2017] (allocating $19 billion for cybersecurity)
108 Jaikumar Vijayan, Despite billions spent, US federal agencies struggle with cybersecurity, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 10, 2015), http://bit.ly/1obxz1S.
109 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 281 (2016),
http://1.usa.gov/1RkzJIk; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, MANAGING CYBER RISKS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2015, at 19 (2014), http://pwc.to/21OpRrV.
110 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL INFORMATION
SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT 6 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1T9FfyF (“The President’s FY 2016
Budget also invests $582 million to drive continued progress through CDM and EINSTEIN
to enable agencies to detect and prevent evolving cyber threats.”).
111 Under Attack - S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs., supra note 42 (written
statement of Dr. Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity & Communications, National Protection and Programs Directorate); see also Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, Securing The .Gov, Remarks Before the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (July 8, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/22L3WUN [hereinafter Johnson - Securing The .Gov](“E3A has the capacity to both identify and block known malicious traffic…one key value of E3A is that it is an intrusion detection and prevention system that uses
classified information to protect unclassified information.”).
112 Johnson - Securing The .Gov, supra note 111
By December 2014, E3A protected 237,414 federal personnel. Today, E3A protects
over 931,000 federal personnel, or approximately 45% of the federal civilian government. I have directed that DHS make E3A fully available to all federal departments
and agencies, and have challenged us to make aspects of E3A available to all federal
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Had EINSTEIN been deployed at OPM, some have suggested the intrusions
could have been detected sooner, if not thwarted completely. 113
Despite the federal expenditure on cybersecurity, the risks for many federal
agencies appear to be getting worse. 114 DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recently
testified:
To be frank, our federal .gov [domain] cybersecurity, in particular, is not where it
needs to be…There is a great deal that has been done and is being done now to secure
our networks. We do, in fact, block a large number of intrusions and exfiltrations, including those by state actors. But much more must be done. 115

While budget concerns continually have resulted in blame from all sides of
the aisle, increased expenditure on cybersecurity infrastructure “does not mean
that all agencies have benefited equally from the largesse.” 116 The Department
of Defense (“DOD”) and DHS have been the largest recipients of federal cybersecurity budgets. With $14 billion set aside for cybersecurity in the 2016
Federal Budget, approximately $5.5 billion is allocated to the DOD. 117
Even in 2014, “the DOD and the DHS alone accounted for $10.3 billion of
the total $12.7 billion in IT [information technology] security spending reported by federal agencies.” 118 In the 2016 budget, DHS is getting a small increase
of $7 million to its $473 million allotment for preventing malicious cyber activity against government agencies, and an additional $102.6 million to its
$722 million budget for detecting, analyzing, and mitigating threats on behalf
of other agencies. 119 Despite these budget increases, OPM dedicated only a
combined $7 million to these two categories of tasks in 2014, even though the
agency stores the PII of 32 million federal employees, more than most other
federal agencies. 120 While budgeting concerns must always remain at the forecivilian departments and agencies by the end of 2015.
Id.

113 Suz Redfearn, Einstein efforts accelerate under the spotlight of OPM breach, FED.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015, 8:35 PM), http://bit.ly/1U7fQRS.
114 GOA-15-725T, supra note 105.
115 Worldwide Threats and Homeland Security Challenges: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (Oct. 21, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1pEIhPt (statement
of Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security) (referring to cybersecurity across all .gov
websites and noting that all .gov websites are subject to increasing threats and are not adequately protected).
116 Vijayan, supra note 108.
117 Sternstein, supra note 37; OMB - FY 2016 BUDGET, supra note 107, at 16; see also
OMB - The President’s Budget for FY 2017, supra note 107.
118 Vijayan, supra note 108.
119 Fact Sheet: Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2016 Budget, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (February 2, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1UW2nkc.
120 Mohana Ravindranath, Before Breach, OPM Requested Millions of Dollars to Upgrade Network Security, NEXTGOV (June 5, 2015), http://bit.ly/1U9ROsm (“OPM’s 2016
budget request, released in February, proposed an additional $21 million in funding to ‘im-
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front of any enterprise—federal or civilian—the priority is and must remain the
implementation of a policy framework that ensures centralized cybersecurity
management. The various incidents in the last several years should ring alarm
bells and demonstrates as how aging infrastructure and fragmented management have crippled the systems tasked with protecting highly sensitive data.
A. 2015: The Year of the Breach
In 2014, the GAO reported that 67,168 incidents were reported by federal
agencies. 121 Given the growth in scope and scale of the cyber risks, it is no surprise that 2015 has given rise four significant incidents that highlight the failure of the current framework. 122 Beginning in late-2014, the United States
Postal Service reported its information technology (“IT”) systems had been
compromised and the data of nearly 800,000 employees had been exposed. 123
In April 2015, the Department of Veteran Affairs announced that uncredentialed access had occurred to its network. 124 In June 2015, the IRS publically disclosed a breach of taxpayer information exposed the records of nearly
330,000 individuals, with potentially more affected. 125 Even before the June
2015 revelation of the largest breach in U.S. history that compromised OPM’s
network, the Director of National Intelligence revealed in February 2015 that
they suspected unauthorized computer intrusions by outside contractors on the
OPM network dating back to early 2014. 126

plement and sustain agency network upgrades’ first initiated in fiscal 2014 and ‘security
software maintenance to ensure a stronger, more reliable and better protected OPM network
architecture.’”).
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-758T, INFORMATION SECURITY:
CYBER THREATS AND DATA BREACHES ILLUSTRATE NEED FOR STRONGER CONTROLS ACROSS
FEDERAL AGENCIES (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1obAkQV [hereinafter GAO-15-758T].
122 Id. at 7, figure 1.
123 Id. at 9; see also Laura Stevens, et al., U.S. Postal Service Says It Was Victim of Data
Breach, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1ZAXxJO.
124 GAO-15-758T, supra note 121, at 8; see also Stevens, supra note 123.
125 Unauthorized Attempts to Access Taxpayer Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 114th Cong. (June 2, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1UVt4Wj (written statement of John
Koskinen, Comissioner, Internal Revenue Service) (“As they continued to investigate, our
team determined that a total of approximately 200,000 suspicious attempts to gain access to
taxpayer information on the Get Transcript application had been made between midFebruary and mid-May.”).
126 JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE
RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1-2
(2015), http://1.usa.gov/20spyDp.
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B. OPM—The Largest Hack in U.S. History
In June 2015, OPM publically reported a cyber intrusion—allegedly by Chinese hackers 127—that affected personnel records of over four million current
and former federal employees. 128 OPM, under then-Director Katherine Archuleta, then announced that a separate incident may have compromised OPM
systems relating to databases on background investigations conducted for security clearance. 129 Despite the fallout from the incident, diminished public perception of the agency, and congressional calls for leadership change at OPM 130,
the Obama Administration defended the actions of OPM and Director Archuleta. 131 Reports issued in the subsequent weeks suggested the total number
of affected federal employees could be much higher, and in early July 2015,
OPM admitted that as many as 21.5 million past, current, and prospective federal employees had been affected by the breach, as well as other individuals for
whom a federal background investigations were conducted. 132
Congressman Jason Chaffetz [R-UT], Chairman of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, has led the congressional charge in challenging OPM regarding its negligent behavior and failed implementation of
compliant cybersecurity measures. 133 Since the revelation of the Breach, several congressional inquiries have led to new information surrounding the events
of the OPM Breach, most recently revealing that 5.6 million fingerprints were
additionally stolen. 134 In response to the increased number of compromised
127 Tian Shaohui, Op-Ed: Irresponsible Remarks on China’s Hacking Another Case of
Habitual U.S. Slander, NEW CHINA (June 5, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://bit.ly/1q9XCIu (dismissing the allegations of Chinese involvement as “obviously another case of Washington’s
habitual slander against Beijing on cyber security”); see generally 161 CONG. REC. S4065
(daily ed. June 11, 2015) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
128 FINKLEA ET AL., supra note 14, at 1-2.
129 Id.
130 Hurd, supra note 13 (“The refusal at the Office of Personnel Management to take
responsibility and move swiftly to address significant deficiencies leads to only one conclusion. Accountability starts at the top. It’s time for a change in leadership at the OPM.”); see
also Joe Davidson, OPM Chief Berated at Hearing; Chairman Calls for Her Head, WASH.
POST (June 16, 2015), http://wapo.st/1sNllzG.
131 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, WHITE HOUSE (June 17, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1UvPsXQ (“Director Archuleta, in one of her first priorities that she identified after taking that job, was to upgrade the OPM computer network, particularly their
cyber defenses. And this is obviously an ongoing process, and the President does have confidence that she is the right person for the job.”).
132 OPM - Steps to Protect Fed. Workers, supra note 19.
133 Davidson, supra note 130; see also Joe Davidson, OPM Director Survives Congressional Inquisition, For Now, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), http://wapo.st/1U7fxqd.
134 Press Release, Office of Personnel Mgmt., Statement by OPM Press Secretary Sam
Schumach
on
Background
Investigations
Incident
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://1.usa.gov/21NYy0E; see, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. D797 (daily ed. July 8, 2015); 114
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fingerprints, Chairman Chaffetz stated:
OPM keeps getting it wrong. This breach continues to worsen for the 21.5
million Americans affected. I have zero confidence in OPM’s competence and
ability to manage this crisis. OPM’s [information technology] management
team is not up to the task. They have bungled this every step of the way. 135
Information released in June 2015 regarding the initial hack of OPM’s network indicates that hackers gained access to employees’ personal information,
including their “Social Security numbers, job assignments, performance ratings
and training information.” 136 The second reported breach involved the theft of
data on 19.7 million current, former, and prospective employees, and contractors who applied for a background investigation in 2000 or after using certain
OPM forms. 137 This second breach also impacted the personal information of
1.8 million non-applicants; OPM notes that these non-applicants are primarily
individuals married to or otherwise cohabitating with background investigation
applicants. 138
OPM confirmed the “[u]sernames and passwords that background investigation applicants used to fill out their background investigation forms were also
stolen.” 139 Notably, the two breaches revealed in June 2015 were not the first
incidents targeting OPM databases containing such sensitive information. 140 In
a previous 2014 breach of OPM, hackers purportedly targeted “files on tens of
thousands of employees who [had] applied for top-secret security clearances.” 141
Reportedly, the hackers used compromised security credentials—those assigned to a KeyPoint Government Solutions employee, a federal background
check contractor working on OPM systems—to exploit OPM’s systems and
CONG. REC. D770 (daily ed. June 25, 2015); 114 CONG. REC. D762 (daily ed. June 24,
2015); A Review of IT Spending and Data Security at OPM: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Serv. & Gen. Gov’t for Fiscal Year 2016, S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong.
6 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1pEmh7j (statement of Hon. Katherine Archuleta, Director of the
Office of Personal Management); 114 CONG. REC. D715 (daily ed. June 16, 2015).
135 Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Fingerprints of Additional 4.5 Million Individuals Stolen in OPM Breach, Chaffetz Responds (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1OT6Xzp.
136 Is the OPM Data Breach the Tip of the Iceberg?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Res., Tech. & Oversight, H.R. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong. 2 (July 8, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1REyEHa; see also Nakashima I, supra note 5.
137 OPM - Steps to Protect Fed. Workers, supra note 19 (including the SF-85, SF-85P,
and SF-86 forms and apply to applications for non-sensitive positions, public trust positions,
and national security positions.).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Michael S. Schmidt, David E. Sanger, & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on U.S. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1XsquYS.
141 Id.

456

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.2

gain access. Officials do not believe the intruders are still in the system. 142 In
the aftermath of the intrusions, Katherine Archuleta stepped down as the director of OPM amid several criticisms with how she managed the agency’s response to the hack, but to many it was merely a passing of blame. 143 Beth
Cobert, Deputy Director for Management and the U.S. Chief Performance Officer since October 2013, was appointed interim acting director for the agency
following Archuleta’s resignation 144 and President Obama has announced his
intention to nominate her as the permanent replacement. 145 In addition, OPM’s
Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing application, the “webbased automated system that was designed to facilitate the processing of standard investigative forms used when conducting background investigations,” has
been taken offline for “security enhancements.” 146
1. Why OPM?
To the typical civilian, OPM is better likened to the Human Resources Department of any business. 147 As such, the agency is responsible for the collection and storage of a substantial amount of confidential and sensitive personnel
records for roughly 32 million past, current, and potential federal employees. 148
Given the nature of federal employment positions, OPM conducts “over two
million background investigations yearly with over 650,000 conducted to supSee, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. D715 (daily ed. June 16, 2015).
Sarah Wheaton & David Perera, Archuleta’s Out, but OPM’s Problems Run Deep,
POLITICO (July 10, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://politi.co/1pMuLdk (“Criticism of Archuleta
mounted last month after she deflected blame for the data breaches during a House Oversight and Government Reform Committee hearing in June, saying decades of neglecting
government security systems was at fault.”).
144 Evan Perez and Wesley Bruer, OPM Director Katherine Archuleta steps down, CNN
(July 11, 2015 10:06 AM), http://cnn.it/1Tvmgee.
145 Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces His Intent to Nominate
Beth Cobert as Director of the Office of Personnel Management (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1UVF0Hw.
146 e-QIP Application Overview, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT. (last visited Mar. 8,
2016), http://1.usa.gov/1SfvTfP.
147 Dominic Rushe, OPM hack: China blamed for massive breach of US government
data, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2015 04:16 AM), http://bit.ly/1s5CeoH; Kaveh Waddell, OPM
Just Now Figured Out How Much Data It Owns, ATLANTIC (NOV. 30, 2015),
http://theatln.tc/1RlmUc5.
148 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION PERFORMANCE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016, (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1SfU8dO (“As a proprietor of
sensitive data—including personally identifiable information for 32 million federal employees and retirees - OPM has an obligation to maintain contemporary and robust cybersecurity
controls. The infiltration of our network last year underscores the importance of these investments.”).
142
143
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port initial security clearance determinations…more than 95% of the Government total.” 149
As an applicant for security clearances, one must “complete a 127-page
Standard Form-86 (“SF-86”), which contains all of their personal information,
work history, family, associates, deviances, and proclivities.” 150 “In the latter
breach, 21.5 million SF-86 were successfully extracted by an unknown actor.” 151 This amount of data collected and stored creates a treasure trove of federal data, including the most sensitive personal records of persons whom have
worked in the Federal Government, as far as 1985. 152 Some have even likened
the breach to stealing the “crown jewels” of federal information, because several million of the compromised records contain the identities and information
of many covert federal operators. 153
2. What Went Wrong at OPM?
Given the sensitive nature of the data that OPM collects and stores on it
servers, it should come as no surprise that OPM on average receives “10 million confirmed intrusion attempts” targeting its network infrastructure each
month. 154 While these intrusions are often unauthorized attempts that are more
readily detectable under the current cybersecurity framework, the larger threat
to the nation’s cyberspace has increasingly come from authorized intrusions
that result from compromised employee credentials and legitimate access to
the network. 155 This threat has become so effective that even the DHS’s newest
systems designed to monitor and detect malicious threats have difficulty deci149 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FED. INVESTIGATIVE SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT TO
STAKEHOLDERS: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 22 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1UQP7P4.
150 HANDING OVER THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE, supra note 47, at 3.
151 MOVING FORWARD, supra note 73, at 5.
152 Nakashima II, supra note 29.
Stored in the system are massive amounts of data, including applicants’ financial histories and investment records, children’s and relatives’ names, foreign trips taken and
contacts with foreign nationals, past residences, and names of neighbors and close
friends such as college roommates and co-workers. Employees log in using their Social Security numbers.
Id.
153 David Perera & Joseph Marks, Newly Disclosed Hack Got ‘Crown Jewels’, POLITICO
(June 12, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://politi.co/1pEu7xN (“‘This is crown jewels material … a
gold mine for a foreign intelligence service,’ said Joel Brenner, a former NSA senior counsel.”).
154 OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
114th Cong. (June 16, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1SfUvp1 (written statement of Katherine Archuleta, Former Director, Office of Personnel Mgmt.).
155 David M. Upton and Sadie Creese, The Danger from Within, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
2014), http://bit.ly/1XsqOac.
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phering what is legitimate and what is truly malicious when it is perpetrated by
compromised credentials. 156 Since the OPM Breach, congressional inquiry and
agency reports have suggested that, despite this threat, OPM possessed the
necessary resources and were repeatedly put on notice of the potential security
threat that their legacy systems posed to the data they maintain. 157
In November 2013, actors breached OPM systems and extracted “manuals”
relating to network assets and information about the internal infrastructure.158
In August 2014, OPM’s largest contractor tasked with providing background
investigation services, USIS, disclosed a breach of its systems by Chinese
hacker that lasted for over a year and compromised the information of approximately 27,000 DHS employees. 159 USIS filed for bankruptcy immediately following OPM’s decision to rescind its contracts and delegated all background
checks to KeyPoint. 160 In December 2014, KeyPoint disclosed a breach of its
network, which had lasted at least 10 months and may have compromised the
information of 48,439 federal workers. 161
In OPM’s 2014 audit, the Inspector General Michael Esser, provided a total
of 29 recommendations covering a wide variety of IT security topics. 162 According to his own testimony during a July 2015 congressional hearing, “Only
3 of these 29 recommendations have been closed to date, and 9 of the open
recommendations are long-standing issues that were rolled forward from prior
year FISMA audits.” 163 However, the three major vulnerabilities in OPM’s
156 Aaron Boyd, DHS cyber moving beyond signature-based protection, FED. TIMES
(March 23, 2016), 12:34 PM), http://bit.ly/22mupHO.
157 MICHAEL R. ESSER, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., REPORT NO. 4A-CI-00-14016, FINAL AUDIT REPORT: FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT AUDIT
FY2014, at 19-20 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1TdetFv; see also Sean Gallagher, “EPIC” fail—
how OPM hackers tapped the mother lode of espionage data, ARS TECHNICA (June 21,
2015, 10:30 PM), http://bit.ly/1WOCD8p; Dina Temple-Raston, U.S. Officials Say Nearly
14 Million Affected In OPM Breach, NPR (June 16, 2015, 6:22 AM), http://n.pr/1UOq8vL.
158 Evan Perez & Tom LoBianco, U.S. Government Hacking Number Sparks Unusual
Drama at Senate Briefing, CNN (June 24, 2015, 4:57 PM), http://cnn.it/1ofze6s (“Asked if
those manuals were akin to blueprints of OPM’s computer systems, [OPM’s CIO] Seymour
answered, ‘It would be fair to say that would give you enough information that you could
learn about the platform, the infrastructure of our system, yes.’”).
159 Kaveh Waddell and Stephanie Stamm, A Timeline of Government Data Breaches,
NAT’L J. (July 6, 2015), http://bit.ly/1Ts9JxH.
160 Id.; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 47, at 3.
161 Zach Noble, OPM Contractors in the Crosshairs, FCW (June 24, 2015),
https://fcw.com/articles/2015/06/24/house-oversight-opm.aspx; Nick Wakeman, Hackers hit
OPM background investigations contractor, WASH. TECH. (Dec. 18, 2014, 11:45 AM),
http://bit.ly/1UVNcHz.
162 See generally ESSER, supra note 156, at 11-36.
163 OPM Data Breach: Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Res. & Tech. in the H.
Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong. (July 8, 2015) (statement of Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, Office of Personnel Mgmt.).
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Cyber Security Protocol contributed to the security incident, which includes:
decentralized cybersecurity governance, outdated systems authorization, and
non-compliant policies, procedures and technical controls. 164
Without a centralized cybersecurity team responsible for overseeing all of
OPM’s cybersecurity efforts, OPM created many instances of non-compliance
with FISMA requirements. 165 Primarily, OPM’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”), is responsible for the agency’s overall cybersecurity
infrastructure and implementation of security controls. 166 However, such responsibilities have been subsequently found to have resided within individual
program offices, leaving many important upgrade programs unimplemented,
untested, and the department in much disagreement about the overarching cybersecurity strategy. Such deficiencies were well documented in all of the
OIG’s Audit Reports, dating back to 2007; however, the implementation of
some new reporting structures within have contributed to better communication within the various program offices and the OCIO. 167
The OIG found that OPM was not in compliance with several standards
promulgated under 40 U.S.C. § 11331, 168 as is required by FISMA 2014, including in the areas of risk management, configuration management, incident
response and reporting, continuous monitoring management, contractor systems, security capital planning, and contingency planning. 169 According to the
OIG’s Congressional testimony, “Not only was a large volume (11 out of 47
systems) of OPM’s IT systems operating without a valid Authorization, but
several of these systems are among the most critical and sensitive applications
owned by the agency.” 170 Even in the wake of the breach, the OIG instructed
that OPM’s Director strongly consider shutting down software systems that did
not have a current and valid authorization. 171 In the audit report, however, the
OIG noted OPM refused and instead stated it would work with information
164

32.

Memorandum from Inspector General McFarland to Director Archuleta, supra note

See ESSER, supra note 156, at 4-6.
Eric Yoder, OPM officials hindering scrutiny of hacked computer systems, watchdog
says, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2015), http://wapo.st/1YT6Jss.
167 OPM Data Breach: Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Affs., 114th Cong. (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter OPM Data Breach: Part I] (statement of
Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt.) (“OPM has implemented a team of Information System Security Officers (ISSO) that report to the OCIO
and who have responsibility for managing security for the agency’s various information
systems.”).
168 40 U.S.C. § 11331.
169 Id.
170 OPM Data Breach: Part I, supra note 167 (statement of Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt.).
171 Michael D. Maloney & Charles R. Lucy, OPM Data Breach (cont’d): What We Know
Now and What Questions Remain, NAT’L L. REV. (July 20, 2015) http://bit.ly/1LSQrOP.
165
166
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system security officers, both to ensure OPM systems maintain current authorizations and no interruptions to OPM’s operations. 172
While there is much to be said about the events that led to the failure of
OPM’s cybersecurity infrastructure and the failure of its managers to implement a centralized cybersecurity system, the events of the Breach have since
led to the resignation of Katherine Archuleta and congressional calls for the
removal of OPM’s CIO, Donna Seymour. 173 Inquiries into the cybersecurity
incident continue, but the public’s interest in the agency’s excuses has waned.
OPM has announced that it will suspend some program systems and applications in order to update their authentication systems. Additionally, OPM has
announced they would provide three years of credit monitoring services to
those affected by the cybersecurity failure in order to show some attempt in
restoring citizens’ trust in the agency’s responsibility of conducting federal
background investigations. 174 While some have condemned the abysmal effort
to bandage what is otherwise unrecoverable sensitive personal information,
OPM continues to show a lack of remorse for this failure and it appears those
who are most plausibly responsible for allowing the hack will retreat in
peace. 175

172 MICHAEL R. ESSER, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., REPORT NO. 4A-IS-00-14017, FINAL AUDIT REPORT: AUDIT OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY CONTROLS
OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT’S INVESTIGATIONS, TRACKING, ASSIGNING,
AND EXPEDITING SYSTEM FY 2014, at 7-8 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1ofBhYp.
173 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Katherine Archuleta, Director of Personnel Agency, Resigns,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1U7fL0G.
[S]he felt new leadership was needed at the federal personnel agency to enable it to
“move beyond the current challenges.”…Her resignation marked a swift reversal but
did little to calm the aftershocks of the disclosure this week of what appears to be the
largest cybertheft affecting the federal government.
Id.; Letter from Rep. Jason Chaffetz to Hon. Beth Cobert, Director, Office of Personnel
Mgmt. (July 22, 2015) (“I am deeply troubled Ms. Seymour remains at her post over a
month after this request was made. My concerns about Ms. Seymour’s ability to serve are
amplified by a communication the Committee received from the Inspector General.”).
174 OPM - Steps to Protect Fed. Workers, supra note 19.
175 Brian Krebs, OPM (Mis)Spends $133M on Credit Monitoring, KREBSONSECURITY
(Sept. 2, 2015), http://bit.ly/1NHQz4D.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has awarded a $133 million contract to
a private firm in an effort to provide credit monitoring services for three years to nearly 22 million people who had their Social Security numbers and other sensitive data
stolen by cybercriminals. But perhaps the agency should be offering the option to pay
for the cost that victims may incur in “freezing” their credit files, a much more effective way of preventing identity theft.
Id.
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IV. OPM BREACH CLASS ACTIONS KEEP PILING UP
Amidst a flurry of bureaucratic banter, congressional inquiry, and administrative politicking, those affected by the colossal failure of the programs and
systems they trusted to safe keep their sensitive personal information were
quick to shoot back with a flood of class actions lawsuits citing a whole host of
legal claims, with more bound to follow. As early as June 29, 2015, the American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”), together with the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFLCIO”), filed the largest class action against OPM, citing nearly 650,000 of its
union members having been directly impacted by the breach. 176 Within a week,
the National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”), which represents 150,000
employees across 31 federal agencies and departments, filed a suit directed at
OPM’s then-Director Katherine Archuleta accusing her of failing act properly
in her capacity as an agency head and negligence with regard to protecting federal workers’ data. 177 Since these cases several other smaller class actions have
filed on by affected individuals, enjoining others affected by the breach. 178
Each case shares a common thread of legal claims stemming from the
Breach and commonly name OPM, Katherine Archuleta, Donna Seymour, and
KeyPoint Government Solutions, the contractor alleged to have handled
OPM’s background checks and suffered a computer network breach in 2014,
as defendants. 179 Generally, the complaints allege OPM had been on notice of
cybersecurity deficiencies since 2007, compounding its failure to comply with
the Privacy Act of 1974, 180 the Administrative Procedure Act, 181 FISMA and
176 Complaint at 8, Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emp. et al. v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. et al.,
Case No. 1:15-cv-1015 (D.D.C. June 29, 2015), http://bit.ly/1UVQPgV.
177 Complaint at 19, Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union v. Archuleta, Case No. 15-3144 (N.D.Cal.
July 8, 2015), http://bit.ly/25rCQ7w [hereinafter Complaint for Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union et
al. v. Archuleta].
178 See, e.g., Krippendorf v. United States, et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-01321 (D.D.C. Aug.
14, 2015), http://bit.ly/1SpzGK9; Woo v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. et al., Case No. 6:1501220 (D.Kan. July 15, 2015); McGarry v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. et al., Case No. 1:15cv-01705 (D.Col. Aug. 7, 2015); Hanagan v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. et al., Case No.
2:15-cv-06045 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 10, 2015).
179 Transfer Order at 2, In re U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
MDL No. 2664 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter In re U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt.
Data Sec. Breach Litig.] (“Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources
of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.”).
180 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
[R]equires federal agencies to establish appropriate administrative, technical and
physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect
against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity that could result
in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience or unfairness to any individual on
whom information is maintained.
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the so-called improvements within FISMA 2014; 182 even going so far as to
claim common law negligence, and a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 183
A. National Treasury Employees Union v. Katherine Archuleta
Unique to the other class action suits brought against OPM in the wake of
the breach, the NTEU cites Katherine Archuleta, OPM’s former Director as the
sole defendant on grounds she is to be held negligent to the extent of her capacity as the head of a federal agency. 184 By failing to heed the repeated warnings of OPM’s OIG and otherwise failing to satisfy obligations imposed on her
by statute and other appropriate authority, the complaint suggests Archuleta
“manifested reckless indifference to its obligation to safeguard personal information provided by NTEU members with the assurance that it would be protected against unauthorized disclosure.” 185 As such, the NTEU argues Director
Archuleta violated NTEU members’ constitutional right to informational privacy, including their right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. 186
B. American Federation of Government Employees and AFL-CIO v. OPM, et.
all
While the NTEU complaint targets Director Archuleta, the AFGE and AFLCIO in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia jointly filed their
complaint citing a whole host of procedural and administrative violations that
extend beyond the former Director to include the agency as a whole and the
third party contractors it utilized to develop its cybersecurity systems. 187 The
AFGE stated that they “will not sit idly by while OPM fails to comply with the
most basic requests for information or provide an adequate response. Even after this historic security breach, OPM has continued to use poor data security
practices and inferior private-sector strategies to solve its security woes.” 188
Id.

181 Amanda Bronstad, DOJ Wants Massive Government Data Breach Suits Consolidated, NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://bit.ly/1TzE4Y6.
182 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128
Stat. 3073 (2014).
183 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184 Complaint for Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union et al. v. Archuleta, supra note 177, at 19.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Press Release, Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emp., AFGE files Class Action Lawsuit against
OPM Officials over Data Breach (June 29, 2015), http://bit.ly/1RvyZN7.
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Most notably, the complaint cites violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 189 and
the Administrative Procedure Act. 190
C. Transfer and Consolidation
Despite the efforts of the affected individuals, the legal and procedural hurdles that such claims may face could impact their standing in the various districts where the complaints have been filed. Even now, the Department of Justice has already filed a Motion for Transfer of Actions with the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) in an effort to consolidate the complaints. 191
On October 1st, the Panel heard arguments on authorization of transfer to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 192 Despite opposition to
centralization from the NTEU 193, on October 9, 2015, the JPML ordered the
transfer and centralization of the various claims to the District of Columbia
given the common factual basis for the claims and requested relief. 194 While the
order applies to the three cases that the Justice Department submitted, the Panel recognized that there are eleven other pending cases against OPM following
the breach, that qualify also to be included in the centralization and transfer.195
On March 14, 2016, counsel for the plaintiffs joined and submitted the amended consolidated complaint. 196 The newly amended complaint includes forty
named plaintiffs against the defendants, which have been limited to the United
States through OPM in its agency capacity and KeyPoint. 197
V. IT’S TIME FOR A CHANGE: A PROPOSAL FOR A CYBERSECURITY
REFORM SOLUTION
The U.S. cybersecurity infrastructure system must adapt to better manage
5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
Id. §§ 500-596.
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federal data. The current state of federal law, amidst the rise of cyber threats,
still lags behind the rapid development of technology; and recent efforts to enact cybersecurity legislation have failed. A complete overhaul is the only way
to achieve a more secure data management infrastructure. While this is easier
said than done, it is necessary to entertain all possible solutions in order to effectively implement meaningful reform that will better secure federal cybersecurity infrastructure.
Essentially, the current framework must be upended. A centralized cybersecurity framework that delegates to DHS regulatory, policing, and enforcement
power to more thoroughly account for the nature of cybersecurity threats and
the impact that breaches pose to national security. In addition, any cybersecurity legislation must enhance oversight of federal agencies and government contractors providing information technology and cybersecurity services to the
government. 198 This would extend liability on them, similar to the liability that
has been imposed on private companies to protect civilian data. 199 Furthermore,
given the sensitive nature of security clearances for the federal workforce and
the Federal Government’s interest in protecting national security it is argued
here DHS should be granted the authority to complete the federal background
check process for potential future federal employees. While this grant would
centralize the process of background checks for the majority of federal employees, defense and intelligence agencies such the DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency should retain their authority to conduct their own background
checks.
Similar to the proposed legislation under the Federal Information Security
Management Reform Act of 2015 currently pending before the 114th Congress, DHS must be tasked with “conducting targeted risk assessments and
operational evaluations.” 200 The current framework is inadequate because DHS
has limited ability to shield agency networks with its highly invested cybersecurity monitoring platform, EINSTEIN. 201 DHS can only enter an agency’s
network with EINSTEIN if the agency asks for help. 202 Under the proposed
law, DHS could run intrusion detection and prevention technology on all agenGAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 45.
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Cong. (2015).
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cy systems. Given the existing investment in cybersecurity infrastructure within federal agencies, congressional legislation like the FISMA Reform Act of
2015 must grant DHS centralized authority to immediately deploy the EINSTEIN platform in its full monitoring capacity within every federal agency.
Together with binding authority, it is recommended that DHS be given the authority to improve security incident response activities by suspending agency
cybersecurity programs if programs do not meet statutorily imposed auditing
requirements. In the interest of national security, DHS must be given the authority to take control of agency networks during cyber-emergencies and clearly define what a cyber-emergency might constitute.
The cornerstone of any cybersecurity legislative reform is the inclusion of
administrative and judicial mechanisms for extending liability on those internally responsible for allowing federal systems to fail, the ability to aggressively pursue cyber criminals, and initiate countervailing measures where foreign
nation-states have engaged in unwarranted government espionage. In many
instances, the government enjoys sovereign immunity, meaning it cannot face
civil suits or prosecution over most subjects. 203 Under the Federal Torts Claims
Act, 204 individuals can sue federal employees for negligence within the scope
of their jobs. 205 This negligence can extend to “loss of property, or personal
injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government.” 206 Under the current standard, courts
have been hesitant to extend property protections to personal data; however,
redefining personal information and data stored as personal property would
offer a more comprehensive legal framework for courts to apply in the event of
data breaches. 207
The more paramount concern, in addition to domestic security efforts, lies in
the ability of the United States to combat cyber-warfare abroad. As attacks
become more sophisticated, particularly in foreign regimes that promote government and industrial espionage, the United States must remain committed to
engaging and setting the global standards for cybersecurity. However, when
domestic policy is fragmented, the nation’s ability to hold the International
Community to such policies is severely diminished. Evidence that progress is
being made in this area has come following an official state visit from China’s
President Xi Jinping. 208 On September 25, 2015, President Obama and Presi203
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dent Xi announced an agreement between the United States and China to establish an open dialogue on combatting cybercrimes. 209
As part of the agreement, each commits to investigate cybercrimes, collect
electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from its
territory, and to provide timely responses to requests for information and assistance concerning those activities. 210 Furthermore, the U.S. and China will establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. 211 Perhaps most importantly, these nations committed that “neither
country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft
of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies
or commercial sectors.” 212
Only time will tell whether these countries will live up to their commitments. According to the agreement, the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue on the U.S. side, which signifies an effort to centralize the role DHS will play in future direction of the
American cybersecurity policy, and ensure that China fulfills its commitments
to advance progress made thus far. 213 To be sure, the agreed commitments do
not resolve all challenges between the U.S. and China or other nation-states on
cyber issues. 214 However, according to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, it does
“represent a step forward in U.S. efforts to address one of the sharpest areas of
disagreement in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.” 215 In the wake of the
OPM Breach, the U.S. seemingly is working to address its own shortcomings
on cybersecurity and meet the commitments of this new agreement. 216
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CONCLUSION
The danger posed by the ever-growing threat of cyber-attacks against the nation is heightened by the revelation of the weaknesses and failures in the Federal Government’s approach to cybersecurity despite having the budget to do
so. While recent government initiatives have tried to combat the issue, it is
important to note that no single technology or set of practices is sufficient to
protect against all potential threats. A comprehensive and centralized strategy
is required that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently applied processes, and appropriately implemented technologies. While agencies
have elements of this strategy in place, more must be done to fully implement
it and to remove existing weaknesses. Following the OPM Breach, OPM must
be mandated to implement GAO and its Inspector General recommendations
that will strengthen the agency’s ability to protect their systems and information, reducing the risk of another potentially devastating cyber-attack.

